THE RSPCA UNMASKED: PART TWO
For a more
detailed introduction to this web page, please go to
http://www.geocities.com/focusrspca2003/index.htm
with reports
from an extraordinary number of highly indignant people aggrieved enough
with
the RSPCA to organize public documentation of their experiences and
observations.
See
Media Release
at bottom of this web site for latest update (April 14, 2003).
This site is
dedicated, after a couple of preliminaries, to the scandalous treatment
meted
out to Glynne Sutcliffe Huilgol, an Adelaide woman whose Australian
kelpie dog,
Banjo, died, when over16 years, of old age.
A
BRIEF BIO is helpful to assessing the
plausibility
of the RSPCA charges:
“Glynne Sutcliffe grew up in Melbourne, where she took
an Honours degree in History and a Diploma of Education from the
University of
Melbourne. She subsequently obtained a Masters degree in South Asian
Languages
and Civilizations from the University of Chicago. She has taught in High
Schools
in Victoria and South Australia, andhas tutored and lectured at the
Universities of Sydney, Flinders and La Trobe, primarily in Sociology…
“In the
nineties she
established the Early Reading Play School to provide the foundations
essential
for children to acquire literacy skills in a simple and easily
accessible way.
She can report that the more than two thousand children who have done
the
program to date are near universally achieving at a level between
eighteen
months to three years ahead of the benchmark expectations for their
age.”
An
extra dimension is given to the Adelaide story by a quick look,
first, at a report on the dreadful consequences for both animals and
people of
an RSPCA campaign in the early 19th century. This is just a reminder
that the
RSPCA’s ruthless disregard for anything but its own (often
self-interested and
ignorant) opinions is not new.
Source:
http://www.nextcity.com/main/town/2planners.htm
Planners from
hell
Victorian
lawmakers
put the dog before cart
In
1824, the newly formed Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals
launched aggressive campaigns to deliver helpless beasts from such
atrocities
as ear cropping, skinning alive, bull baiting and cockfighting. But in
its
zealousness, the RSPCA also targeted the common practice of using dogs
as
beasts of burden.
Hauling dogs
were an essential part of life and economy of the time. Only the
relatively
well off could afford to maintain horses, but the even poorest family
was able
to keep a dog in the family home and feed it scraps. Working dogs —
Newfoundlands, Great Pyrenees and Saint Bernards — hauled textiles and
produce
from town to town quickly and efficiently. The gentry, including Queen
Victoria
herself, were strong supporters of attempts to stop dog hauling. Dogs,
to this
segment of society, were pampered pets and status symbols. The RSPCA
played to
the sentiments of the public and Parliament with tales of hideous
mistreatment.
Their efforts finally paid off, and by 1855, an act of Parliament
outlawed the
use of dogs as beasts of burden throughout the U.K. Fish and vegetable
merchants petitioned to prevent passage of the law on the grounds that
they
would be forced out of business, but public opinion was clearly on the
side of
dogs.
Instead of
saving dogs, however, the new law caused untold suffering. Small
merchants and
hawkers had no use for the animals that had once been vital to their
lives.
Suddenly they were an unaffordable luxury, and their owners either
turned them
out on the streets, or simply slaughtered them. Terrible massacres were
reported in places like Birmingham, Liverpool and Cambridge as these
cities
struggled to cope with the packs of starving dogs roaming their streets.
- Cecily Ross
DOCUMENT
1: Glynne Sutcliffe
Huilgol’s initial
response to the RSPCA charge that she ‘ill-treated an
animal’…
Banjo
and the RSPCA
A statement
made by Glynne Sutcliffe,
on Monday 17th December 2001
One year ago
exactly, on Sunday 17th December 2000,
at4.40pm my dog Banjo was seized by the RSPCA, and subsequently
euthanased without
consultation with me, or my consent.
I had been home
for the previous 2-3 days when the dog was outside the house. The
dog was
seized when I uncharacteristically went out to an end of year social
occasion.
(My social life is pretty thin on the ground.) This was a
whistle-blowers end-of-year get together. I left at about 3.00pm, to my
recollection, and got home about 9.00pm to find the RSPCA note on my
door.
The time span
between my departure and the RSPCA arrival strongly suggests that I had
been
under surveillance, and that the raid was timed very precisely to avoid
any
confrontation or discussion with me about the dog.
Banjo was
sixteen years old, and he was dying. He had had arthritis that had made
it
difficult (but not impossible) for him to get around for some
time.
He was
originally my daughter’s dog, given to her as a Christmas present in
December,
1984. However he continued to live in the family home after she
left in
order to live closer to the university. At that stage he became to all
intents
and purposes my dog, and for the ten years after my family’s break-up,
between
1990 and his death in 2000, he was my daily companion.
My sister’s
photograph of him has hung on the lounge room wall for the last few
years.
When he became
immobile in that last week of his life, at first he was in the house.
But he
became incontinent, and wet the carpet. At that point I put him
outside. He was quite a heavy dog, and I could not lift him, but I
put
him on a blanket which meant that I could pull him as necessary into the
shade. I left water close to him, and gave him aspirin to relieve
the
arthritis pain. Being summer, the couple of days before the RSPCA raid
were quite
warm. When they arrived he was on the east-facing verandah where I had
left him
in the afternoon shade.
When I got home
to find him gone, and the RSPCA notice of seizure on the door, I became
very
upset, and immediately rang the number indicated on the note, and
protested
about what had been done. I learnt he had been put down.
I asked for the
return of his body, so I could bury him on the property where he had
lived his
entire life. I was told this was impossible. I presume it was impossible
because they had immediately cremated him. They did not admit to this,
but said
that once an animal had gone into the Veterinary Pathology Services
building at
33 Flemington St. Glenside, that it could not leave that building!
I feel that the
whole episode was outrageous, for reasons that are no doubt not legally
‘relevant’.
However, there
do seem to be some issues that a court should take into account:
1) Is there a legal requirement that a
dying animal be put down? (If this
is the case I was certainly not aware of that legislation)
2) If the government requires that a
dying animal be put down, apart from
the moral and emotional aspects of the situation, is it legitimate to
demand
that someone with limited resources,
spend a large sum of money on getting a pet, admittedly ill and
suffering,
killed? It is extremely hard to get out of a vet’s surgery without
parting with
$150 to $200.
3) On the moral and emotional side,
Kevin Andrews fought a good fight
against euthanasia for human beings. And the
government agreed. The pro-death lobby was voted down. Are
animals of
lesser consequence than human beings? I don’t see any reason to
suppose
this. I believe that a companion animal should be allowed to die a
natural death in the place where it has lived its life.
4) The RSPCA is becoming better known
for killing animals than for
protecting them. I think it may be time for the government to
investigate its
activities. To say the least, its personnel are high-handed in the
extreme.
They assume the right of the Almighty to determine questions of life and
death.
They act in a dictatorial fashion. They determine arbitrarily what
should or
should not be done. And their claim to always decide properly requires
extraordinary effort to contest. See report on The Australian on 11 Oct.
2001.
5) Animals have died of natural causes
for millennia. Perhaps there
is another angle to this situation. Does the RSPCA think that I should
perhaps
in some way have prevented Banjo from dying?
6) It is extremely likely that the
RSPCA’s prosecution of this case is to
be attributed to their anger at my protesting their decisions, and their
intention to teach me that they have the upper hand, and that they can
make
whatever decisions they like without asking anyone.
7) There is a very strange time lapse
of some 7- 8 months between the
seizure of the dog, and the decision to prosecute. I would like to
find
out why it took so long to act, if they felt action was warranted.
(To my
recollection, the case was instigated in late July or early August,
2001.)
8) POSTSCRIPT: Friday 8th February 2002.
On reflection I
put it to the court that the case should be dismissed; there is no case
to
answer. The dog was within hours of a natural death.
The RSPCA has
described his death as ‘hideous’– this is highly emotive language. Death
is not
ever pretty. Death is the anthithesis of life. Laws prevent
pro-euthanasia
doctors plying their trade with human beings. If it is my lot to die in
pain I
am prepared to accept it as the price of life, rather than help
institutionalize medical practice that permits or should we say
encourages
putting people down. Animals are not fundamentally different from human
beings.
The argument that this or that animal should be ‘put out of its misery’
is a
specious rationalization of human hubris. It is an attempt to claim
moral
virtue for human convenience. What it means is that the animal in
question is
no longer useful to human beings.
I have only
ever been to Oakbank once, and I would never go again. The occasion I
attended
was marked by the brutal and hideous killing of two lovely horses,
despite my
offer of caring for them on my property. Logically, if a steeplechaser
breaks
and ankle, it is reasonable to conclude that it will never race again.
On the
other hand, we know how to mend bones. A horse could easily be put in a
body
sling while its leg mended. It could have a long and happy life after
the leg
was mended, even if it was no longer a top racer. It is killed because
its
owner deems it of no commercial value any more. Given the amount of
money that
the horses in question had no doubt earned for their owner prior to
falling and
injuring themselves in an activity designed and pursued for human
entertainment, it seems especially vicious that the owner doesn’t choose
to
have them healed.
I don’t see any
race-horse or steeple-chaser owners in court for murder, though there is
a case
to be made, in contrast with this instance of Banjo’s death from old
age. His
life with me was longer than many other dogs of his breed ‘normally’ enjoy – testimony, I think, to the care
and love that he got.
DOCUMENT
2: the charge of ‘ill-treating an
animal’ was refined to ‘failure to
alleviate distress’ in order to avoid the implication that Glynne
actively hurt
her dog.
The first day
of the trial consisted entirely of RSPCA Inspector Peter Master’s
statements
and the testimony of the two vets called in by the RSPCA to back up, or
amplify
Peter Master’s assertions.
Following the
first day of the trial, on 2nd July, 2002,
the local newspaper, The Advertiser, ran a major story on p.7,
accompanied by a photograph.
On the second
day, July 3, Glynne Sutcliffe cross-examined the ‘expert witnesses’, and
discovered dimensions to the story that the RSPCA had essentially lied
about.
These extra dimensions were certainly relevant to getting a more
realistic
understanding what was going on.
The Advertiser,
contacted on the morning of the 4th July with a
letter corrective of the earlier story simply refused to publish the
corrections, modifications, etc. Here is what they refused to
publish:
“Bill Murray
Letters Editor,
The Advertiser
121 King
William St.
Adelaide, SA
5000
Fax : 8206 3669
4th July 2002
BANJO’S
STORY
–
SOME EXTRA
FACTS USEFUL TO THINKING ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED
Dear Editor,
Readers of your
story (Wednesday 3rd July) on the death of Banjo, my red kelpie dog, and
my
trial for ‘failure to alleviate distress’, may be interested in what
emerged on
the following day. (I am puzzled that you ‘rushed to judgment’ with a
half-told
and still unfolding story, derived almost entirely from RSPCA Senior
Inspector
Peter Masters ’self-justificatory narrative.)
Supporters of
the RSPCA might appreciate knowing more of the details so they can
better
assess how the RSPCA uses the money they donate.
The trial has
taken two days so far, and I have not yet had a chance to speak, except,
on the
second day, as a cross-examiner of prosecution witnesses. It was this
cross-examination that produced initially suppressed details of high
relevance.
The trial has now been adjourned until12th November.
Banjo was a
much loved companion animal born in November 1984, and therefore over
sixteen
years of age when he died on Sunday, 17th December 2000.
A photograph of
Banjo taken by my sister has hung on my lounge room wall for the last
several
years. He was getting old, and had been in failing health for some time.
He had
long since ceased to be of any ‘use’, e.g. as a guard dog. It would have
been
considered quite ‘normal’ had I decided to have him ‘put down’ at any
time in
those last two years of his life. But I felt I owed him. He had stood by
me. I
would stand by him. I had no wish to take his life. I made a conscious
decision
against euthanasia, and for letting nature take its
course.
After reading
my two-page defence, Magistrate Eardsley initially set a date for a
Pre-Trial
Conference (rather than a trial) because, he said, it was most likely to
settle
in the PTC. His comment suggested he was puzzled by the RSPCA
prosecuting
an owner for allowing a sixteen year old dog to die in its own
time. (Magistrate Prescott subsequently chose not to
facilitate
settlement at the PTC. His reasons for doing so were not given. It is
possible
that his reasons were not entirely derived from the facts of the case in
front
of him. See below.)
The general air
of unreality about the trial was exacerbated by discussion of the need
to
prove, by reference to witnesses, that a dog was an ‘animal’ within the
meaning
of the relevant legislation –i.e. had vertebrae and was neither a fish
nor a
human.
Two key RSPCA
witnesses, Dr. Sarah Drysdale, veterinary surgeon, and Dr. Julie Lucas,
veterinary pathologist, said they had estimated Banjo’s age as “mature”,
“over
5”, “between 5 and 9 or 10 years of age”. (That they could be so much in
error
here does suggest there may be problems with the rest of their
testimony.)
The path tests
ordered by the RSPCA generated the report that he died of acute
necrotising
myositis and cellulitis. We were told that this had to be a consequence
of
‘inoculation’ with clostridium spores. Clostridium spores can only
infect the
body as a result of a bite or other wound. This wound was not located or
sighted either by Dr. Drysdale or by Dr. Lucas. I assume therefore I
could not be
held responsible for any over sight in this matter.
Clostridium
infections, we learnt, are extremely rare in domestic animals but are
reported
in the literature, and have rapid onset and rapid progression. A bit
like
meningococcal infections in humans, if you catch such an infection in
the early
stages it can be cured with antibiotics, but in the case of clostridium
infections, if 24 hours pass and the symptoms begin to appear, it is
already
too late and the animal will die within 24 to 48 hours –unless you can
get
access to rare specialist expertise. This expertise is completely
unavailable
in SA. It is to be found only at Melbourne or Sydney universities.
Now because the
veterinary professionals thought Banjo was much younger than he actually
was,
and the RSPCA seized the dog when I was not at home, it followed that
they took
no history of the dog -and could not link his condition to his age or
medical
history. They could not have known that he displayed no symptoms other
than
lying down, going into a coma, or semi-coma, and becoming
incontinent.
Dr. Lucas gave the court along list of symptoms which she inaccurately
supposed
must have been manifest, and which I therefore must have ignored. The
entire
list was constructed on the basis of assumptions that were a totally
inadequate
guide to the realities of the situation.
Had they known
Banjo’s age and medical profile, they may have concluded that
irrespective of
the technical cause, the shutting down of all of the body’s vital
systems is
the immediate precursive to a natural death. The Advertiser
reported me
as ‘admitting’ that I knew he was dying. I did not ‘admit’ anything – I
informed those who enquired that this was the case.
Because he was
virtually comatose, Banjo’s awareness of pain was presumably minimal.
The
greatest amount of pain and distress that he experienced in his last 24
hours
of life is likely to have been the result of being bundled up in
Inspector
Peter Masters’ RSPCA blanket and being tossed into the back of Masters’
van,
and driven around the countryside until he located the emergency vet
services
at Anzac Highway, and then being prodded and poked by a vet who wanted
to add
to her store of medical knowledge - before she decided, arbitrarily,
with no
effort to contact me at all, that she should proceed with immediate
euthanasia.
Masters told
the court that Banjo was ‘lying in his own urine’ and that he stank so
badly
that Masters had to open his van windows to get some fresh air as he
drove
Banjo around. That this was a massive exaggeration was clear when Dr.
Drysdale
failed to confirm this assertion of odour. On oath, she said she
detected no
untoward smell at all. Neither did I, when sitting with him on my front
porch,
as I did during those last couple of days.
Cross
examination of Dr. Lucas elicited the information that palliative care
for
Banjo would have cost upwards of $1800,and that this would only have
been
provided in the context of allowing the owner time to come to terms with
the
grieving process in the hope of obtaining agreement to euthanase within a
few
hours. Dr. Lucas also confirmed that Adelaide has no institution
comparable
with Melbourne’s Lort Smith Animal Hospital, from which, had I been in
Melbourne, I may have sought some advice regarding Banjo, even given my
view
that in the circumstances it would be useless to hope for a veterinarian
solution.
The RSPCA’s
intervention in Banjo’s dying meant that I wasn’t able to sit with him
at the
end, and that he was cremated in the pathology services lab, so that I
could
not bury him on the property where he had lived his life.
It seems that a
natural death is no longer permitted domestic animals.
Our courts are
generally expected to endeavor to make judgments that are comparable in
comparable circumstances.
Assuming that
legislation covering children is stricter than the legislation covering
animals, it follows that every parent of every child that has died, or
in
future will die, of meningococcal disease should be prosecuted for
failure of
duty of care, as well as for failure to alleviate distress – because
death
would not have ensued (speaking generally)if the parents had been alert
to the
initial symptoms. That they were not so alert would automatically have
caused a
failure to provide appropriate medication according to the latest
medical text
books. And the child would have died in excruciating distress,
etc.
It follows that
the elderly husband of a woman who died of cellulitis, within a week of a
small
circle of cellulitis appearing on her hand, should be prosecuted not for
failure to alleviate distress but for murder.
It follows that
every farmer in the country who has had an animal die without knowing
the
reason, and without consulting a vet, must similarly be hauled into
court.
The world does
not have enough lawyers, magistrates or available court times – not even
in
lawyer-dense Adelaide!
There may be a
more ‘logical’ explanation of what has been going on than the facts of
the case
seem to warrant. It is not irrelevant, incidentally, that I was
attending an SA
Whistleblowers function on the Sunday afternoon when Banjo was seized.
A dairy farmer
friend of mind asked me why I am being subjected to a witch-hunt, the
magnitude
of which he is fully aware is not limited to prosecuting me for the
dying of an
old dog, dear friend, whose time had come. Actually he knows the answer.
Readers of The
Advertiser can perhaps draw their own conclusions if they know that,
since
a break-in at my home in 1995, I have been asking for an enquiry into
police
corruption in SA. More specifically, during the early months of this
year I ran
an appeal in the Supreme Court, alleging police harassment - which has
been
ongoing since my1996 detailed accusations to the Police Complaints
Authority,
and intensified with my public statement on the matter at a Business
Enterprise
Centre networking breakfast on 14th June, 2000. There were three
separate hearings
in the Supreme Court, amounting to some five or six hours of
argumentation. The
hearings were brought to a close when Justice Wicks decided he did not
have
jurisdiction in the matter! I am not sure how to interpret this,
but
certainly it did not amount to denying the truth of what I was
saying.
Why am I not
surprised that The Advertiser chose to report the RSPCA’s
accusations
against me, and not my accusations against the police?
Now that WA has
bitten the bullet on police behaviour maybe its time for SA to follow
suit. As
a matter of general policy I am recommending serious attention be paid
to the
application of the principle of zero tolerance to the police before any
attempt
is made to apply it to the public at large.
Glynne
Sutcliffe, MA (Chicago)
BA Hons, Dip Ed (Melb.)
Chandlers Hill,
SA
8270 3548
PS: When I came
home after the first day of the trial my three year old Siamese tom cat
had
disappeared. Tom cats do wander. This is not the season. Nor has he
reappeared
by the time of writing this addendum, 7 days later, on 9th July. Wandering tom cats return
home.
That he has been stolen by one or more persons who knew that I was in
the city
that day is a near unavoidable conclusion. He was friendly, and would
have been
easy to catch.
PS: We
have recently had a large scale public debate about the way insurance
companies
have demanded a rake-off from every tennis club and senior citizens’
group in
the country, via the mechanism of public liability insurance. I believe
there
is some analogy to be drawn with the vested interest implied in the
demand that
owners of companion animals develop a life-time relationship with their
local
vet.”
DOCUMENT
3: a statement made by Mr. Robert
Owen, a volunteer who helped Glynne with
running the Early Reading Play School for a couple of years, including
during
2000, when Banjo’s health was failing.
Statutory
Declaration
I, Robert Hugh
Owen, of Ansett Ave, Netley, do affirm and swear that I met Glynne
Sutcliffe in
March of 2000 and that I helped her with the Early Reading Play
School
project until approximately November 2001.
In the course
of doing this I needed to be at her home on Main Rd., Chandlers Hill, on
a
several days per week basis and as a result of this, I became very
friendly with her red kelpie, Banjo.
Although I have
never owned a dog, I have always been involved with dogs belonging to
close
friends and relatives. I always enjoyed good relationships with dogs and
many
dog owners remarked how I handled their dog and how well their dogs
accepted
me. This included a Doberman and other large aggressive dogs.
When I first
met Banjo it was obvious that he was aging but was a healthy well cared
for
animal. I noticed after several months that he was gradually becoming
less
mobile.
He initially
had a female terrier visitor from an adjoining property who would come
visiting. Banjo would take off after the terrier although he was never
going to
achieve what he set out to do. I noted later that he was becoming much
less
able to even run after the terrier.
I also noted
that Banjo was becoming incontinent as he was having a few accidents in
the
house. I found this a little difficult to deal with and was surprised at
how
patient Glynne was toward this occurring – she would never get cross
with Banjo
and I came to realise how close she was to Banjo. I used to get Banjo
into his
chair as he was finding it more difficult to get around. I noted that he
often
needed help to get to the lawn to urinate.
I spoke to
Glynne about Banjo and said that I thought that Banjo didn’t have very
long to
live as he was becoming less interested in his food, less mobile and he
had
lost all interest in the terrier. Although Banjo did not appear to
be in
any obvious pain, and he never whimpered when being handled, I did
wonder
whether it would be humane to have him put down. I was interested in
this issue
as I have a cat that is very old – over twenty-one years who is also
becoming
less mobile, yet she appears happy and contented – although a vet had
advised
us that she was dying due to kidney failure some ten years ago!
Glynne said she
wanted Banjo to live out whatever time nature had allocated to him.
Banjo was
not sick; he was old and was slowly dying. I have seen this same
situation with
many of my friend’s animals. Because it was close to Christmas and
nothing was
happening at the time with the school, I was not at Chandlers Hill in
December
of 2000. But whatever the immediate cause (clostridial infection?) of
Banjo’s
death, that he was into the dying process was obvious much earlier in
that
year.
I was shocked
when I found out what had happened to Banjo, and believe that a great
injustice
has been done to Banjo as well as to Glynne.
DOCUMENT
4: a letter written for
submission to the Magistrates
Court by Glynne’s son, Dr. Vivek Huilgol. This letter was sent fromDr.
Huilgol’s place of work in a large hospital in Shreveport, Louisana. It
was deemed
inadmissible as ‘evidence’ on the grounds that Dr. Huilgol was not an
expert
(despite getting his medical degree here in South Australia), that he
was not
present in court (so could not be cross-examined by the RSPCA
lawyer),and that
his testimony was based on hearsay!
CHARGES
SHOULD
BEDISMISSED
- CASEWITHOUT LEGITIMACY
- CONDUCTOF RSPCA REPREHENSIBLE
Louisiana, USA
November 11,
2002
Reference:
Glynne Sutcliffe Huilgol and Banjo
Dear Sir or
Madam,
As a Specialist
Physician licenced in Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA, as the
son of
Ms. Sutcliffe Huilgol,and as a dog owner I feel I am in a unique
position to
assist the court with its deliberations regarding my mother and her
alleged
mis-treatment of her dog, Banjo, prior to its involuntary euthanasia by
the
RSPCA.
Certainly the
topic of euthanasia provokes passionate feelings, but both the Supreme
Court in
the USA and the Australian judiciary has deemed euthanasia illegal in
humans. I
see little to distinguish the level of care we should provide people and
animals; however we have a special obligation to make informed decisions
on
behalf of those that are unable to do so – be they human or animal.
I believe the
conduct of the RSPCA to be reprehensible in the extreme and was based in
large
part on their inadequate assessment of the age of the dog. Banjo was
over 16
years of age – his longevity a direct tribute to the level of care
provided by
my mother over the years. Evidence presented by the RSPCA veterinary
‘experts’
has demonstrated their inability to determine the age of a dog; this
calls into
question their entire credibility. To assert that driving a dying dog in
the
back of a car for a number of hours in the heat of the Australian summer
was
providing compassionate care is highly questionable. Further, the entire
notion
that any dying animal has to be ‘put down’ is at best a matter for
debate
amongst learned individuals and should not form the basis for
prosecution.
Finally,
clostridial infections are difficult to diagnose at the best of times
and are
associated with a high mortality. Often, they represent the ‘final
common
pathway’ of a dying individual. For example, a person may suffer trauma
in a
gunshot injury; several days later they may die from a clostridial
infection.
Which then was the ‘cause of death’– the clostridial infection? Most
people,
provided that scenario, would state the person died from ‘complications
of the
gunshot injury’. When the elderly die from ‘old age’ the final cause of
death
is often a decreased blood supply throughout the body as the heart
finally gets
weaker, the lungs and then the patients succumb to pneumonia; no
physician
would be prosecuted because an elderly person died in their sleep.
In both humans
and animals we live in a state of constant battle against bacteria that
thrive
in the host throughout life; a sour immune systems weaken, as our hearts
pump
less effectively, and as we oxygenate our bloodstream less effectively
with
age, these so-called ‘normal flora’ have an opportunity to multiply and
hasten
or ‘cause’ death. When younger, pneumonia often responds well to
antibiotics.
But few people would state that one-third of people die from pneumonia
because
of inadequate medical care, yet pneumonia does represent the ‘final
common
pathway’ for many of us.
The veterinary
experts have, I believe, presented testimony to the effect that highly
specialized resources would have been necessary to intervene to save
Banjo’s
life, but that these resources do not exist in South Australia.
I served in the
Royal Australian Air Force as a physician and was, for two years (1989 –
1991),
the Senior Medical Officer for Air Base Darwin. In the Northern
Territory, at
that time, no neuro-surgical resources were available in Darwin. If a
person
had a severe head trauma in the NT, their chances of dying were greater
than if
that same person had the identical injury in Adelaide. Were physicians
prosecuted for not providing anon-existent resource? Clearly, access to
resources and circumstances do dictate the level of care we are able to
provide.
There is no
dispute that the dog, Banjo, was dying. However, I hope that the Court
has been
persuaded that the ‘evidence’ of mistreatment by my mother is without
foundation in law; she acted in the best interests of the animal, within
the
limit of the resources available to her in South Australia. The question
that
remains is “must all dying animals be ‘putdown?” If the answer is no, as
it
surely must be, then the case against her is without legitimacy.
I respectfully
ask that the Court dismiss the charges against my mother.
Sincerely,
Vivek R.
Huilgol, BM, BS (Flinders 1986)
DOCUMENT
5:
Defendant’s Concluding Argument (with further attachments)
RSPCA vs
Glynne Sutcliffe
Adelaide
Magistrates Court
14th
March 2003
Defendant’s
concluding and summary arguments:
There
is no substance to the primary charge that I ill-treated an animal.
Animals
who live with me are an integral part of my household. Banjo was
part and
parcel of my everyday life for sixteen years. He was in and out of the
house
all the time, until at the end his incontinence mean the had to be put
outside.
Because it was summer, this was easier on him than if it had been
winter.
Banjo
was a loyal and loving dog. We often went on long beach walks together.
He had
the run of my property. He frolicked for most of his life. In his later
years
he slowed down. I had not been able to take him down to the beach for a
while
before he died – maybe a couple of years –because he only got half way
from
Seacliff to the Brighton jetty before
he just sat down and refused to go any further – and I had been
accustomed to
taking him all the way up to the Somerton yacht club and back. At this
point I suppose,
it would have been culturally normal for me to have him put down. I
rejected
this option. I loved that dog. He loved me.
Your
Honour told me at the outset that the onus of proof was on the
prosecution and
that the RSPCA had to prove five essential elements contained within the
charge
of ill-treatment, each to be held to be true beyond reasonable doubt.
You said
that if you were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the
essential elements had been proved, the law requires that the charge be
dismissed.
The
five essential elements you itemized were that:
-
first, I was the owner of the dog in
question;
- second,
that the dog is an animal within the meaning of the Act;
- third,
that the dog suffered pain within the meaning of the Act;
- fourth,
that there were steps I did not take which could have been taken, which
would
have alleviated the pain suffered by the dog;
- fifth,
that the steps which I am alleged not to have taken were steps which any
ordinary reasonable person would have taken in the circumstances in
which I was
placed.
I am
grateful for the clarity of this outline, and will speak to each
essential
element in turn, with the intention of challenging the last three
elements.
To
do so, the most important preliminary is to establish the age of the
dog,
because the prosecution case falls in a heap, primarily on this point.
One
can say that the failure of the prosecution’s “expert witnesses” on this
matter
of age does throw doubt on their credibility with respect to anything
and
everything else, because their estimates were so much in error.
At
first I thought that these estimates only proved a failure of
credibility
in our expert witnesses. It is possible that there is something else
going on
here as well, an issue I’ll briefly specify in a moment - not that I
will
pursue this point, except to flag the apparent collusion of our
‘experts’ as
possibly indicative of a conspiracy to falsify, in order to magnify the
prosecution case.
I
have to correct a minor aspect of earlier testimony on this matter of
age. I
said earlier that my daughter was given Banjo as a puppy for her
birthday on 26th
June 1984, when she turned seventeen.
This is not true. She was given a Siamese kitten, Sheba, on her
birthday
in 1984. She was given the red kelpie pup, Banjo, for Christmas that
year. He
was born in November, 1984. I am sorry for the confusion. The difference
is not
substantive.
This
fact of Banjo’s real age was established to the satisfaction of the
prosecution
when Mr. Tremaine made a telephone call to my daughter, a surgical
dermatologist, at her rooms in the city, whereupon she confirmed the
above.
So
we are dealing with the last hours of an Australian red kelpie who was
sixteen
years and two months of age. The significance of this is that the normal
life
expectancy of Australian red kelpies is between ten and fourteen years.
So
Banjo was more than two years older than the upper limit of life
expectancy for
his breed.
Regarding
this, there is an implication that I just promised to make explicit, and
that
is that the RSPCA’s prosecution of me in this matter is not to be
explained by
‘the facts of the case’. There is a clear possibility that the
veterinarian
experts who ‘estimated’ Banjo to be somewhere between five and ten years
of age
in fact chose those figures because it placed him in an age range less
than the
lower limit of normal life expectancy. If there is bad faith here it
would have
to be in order to have us believe that Banjo was ill, and could have
been
cured, rather than dying of old age, and beyond veterinarian help, other
than
the ‘help’ of putting him down. This is an important point which I can’t
explore at this moment, but which nevertheless deserves some attention
at some
time.
Furthermore,
there is no legislation which requires that the owner of a pet or
companion
animal have that animal put down at the end of its life. No Parliament
on earth
can ban natural death. No-one can be accused of ill-treating a human or
an
animal if they fail to prevent natural death. Being both natural and
inevitable, death will come to all of us in due course.
And there is no dictionary which allows that
the demand for ‘alleviation of pain’ be deemed equivalent to euthanasia. That there is a culturally normative habit
of putting pet or other animals down - when their owners deem them to
have
reached some point of no return - is not relevant here. (I might add
that I
find it usually quite appalling to hear the frequent confessions of pet
owners
that they “had to have X put down” for this all too often quite
inadequate
reason.)
Let
us turn to the five essential elements that must be proven if the charge
is to
stand.
Regarding
the first: yes, I was the effective owner of the male, red kelpie dog,
called
Banjo, that was seized and euthanased without my consent, and in my
absence, by the RSPCA on Sunday
afternoon, 17th December 2000.
While
the dog was given as a puppy to my daughter, Shyamala, he was with me as
his
primary care-taker pretty much from the beginning of Shyamala’s days as a
medical student at the University of Adelaide in 1986.When she was away
for six
months for her fifth year overseas medical placement in 1990-1 that
transfer of
effective or substantive ownership was established.
Secondly,
I have no problem with the idea that a dog is an animal within the
meaning of
whatever legislation the SA Parliament has passed regarding animals.
Thirdly
then let me turn to the question of the dog’s suffering and pain,
‘within the
meaning of the Act’ and my supposed failure to ‘alleviate’ that pain.
In
terms of the wording used by Your Honour, suggesting that I may be held
liable
for failing to take reasonable steps to alleviate pain suffered by the
animal
e.g. by reason of age, I say that all the ‘evidence’ we have heard
concerning
the distress the dog was supposed to be in, has been over-ridden by the
agreed
upon comatose or semi-comatose condition of the dog.
Coma
is nature’s way of eliminating awareness of pain. Everything
that Senior Inspector Peter Masters or Dr. Sarah
Drysdale did that forced Banjo back into consciousness was more hurtful
to him
than to have left him alone.
Further
Dr. Lucas’ comments about the degree of pain he ‘must’ have been
suffering must
be set aside as purely suppositional in the light of her statement that
there
were no external signs of pain, or indeed of clostridial infection (e.g.
no
external wound), no external sign of oedema, or anything else, that
would
prompt an owner to diagnose pain, or, for that matter any kind of
infection.
Everything she has said about Banjo necessarily having been in pain has
been
based on the evidence of the autopsy, and her diagnosis of clostridial
infection, and her claims, based on 20-20 hindsight, on what this logically
is deemed to have meant. But the logic on which she relies takes as an
assumption that Banjo was much younger than he was, and that he was ill
rather
than dying, that he was conscious and therefore capable of feeling pain,
and
could have been cured if I had been more alert to his symptoms (assuming
those symptoms a) existed, and b) were of illness rather than of dying –
assumptions which cannot be taken as even relevant, let alone true,
given the
age and medical history of the dog. Certainly they are not proven
‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’.)
Regarding
Dr. Drysdale’s remarks about Banjo’s flinching when touched because of
the
clostridial infection, please remember that he had had arthritis for
some time.
Arthritis may indeed now have many glorious new drugs to use in its
treatment.
None of them would be of any use in an old dog whose life was winding
down, and
who needed comforting rather than medication. Care in stroking or
touching him
when he was lying down was an automatic response to knowing he had had
arthritis for some time, not that he had developed a ‘clostridial
infection’.
I
should perhaps speak to the issue of recumbence, which seems to have
been taken
as the most important and primary indicator of illness. Dr. Lucas’
belief that
because he was recumbent he must have required veterinary attention is a
non
sequitur. The one simply doesn’t entail the other. And here we are
dealing
with conclusions that again seem best attributed to the wrong estimate
of
Banjo’s age. If indeed he was only five years old, or even if he were
only ten
years old, maybe recumbence would be reasonably taken to be indicative
of
illness that could usefully be treated. But not when he was over sixteen
years of
age.
I am
a reasonable person, and I believe I came to a totally reasonable
assessment
that Banjo’s recumbence was a signifier for his imminent death. I know
of no
animal – or human – that dies of old age while standing.
(see Transcript p.95)
I
refer to Mr. Robert Owen’s oral testimony and formal statement to
support this
commonsense and reasonable assessment of what was happening to Banjo on
the
weekend of the 17th of December 2000.
As
an average member of the public who happened to own a dog, I am at this
point
up against views held by Dr. Lucas that, whether consciously or
unconsciously
must be linked to her professional self-interest. For
Dr. Lucas is quite adamant that human-administered euthanasia
is the only proper way for an animal to die. (Transcript p.95 ff)
She
admits that vets have no definition of a normal death.
The
implication is clear, that the owner of any animal, companion or
otherwise,
that dies in the course of nature must be prosecuted, if the animal is,
for
example, recumbent for 24 hours or so.
I
cannot possibly go into the extensive arguments that have been heard
around the
subject of euthanasia. Like my son (who is a doctor, and therefore an
expert of
sorts as defined by this court) I see no reason to treat animals any
differently from humans, or to regard them as subject to a different set
of
moral values. (Furthermore, I am consistent here, insofar as I don’t eat
animals either). (Had my son’s letter been admitted into evidence his
comments
here could be documented, instead of me just citing what he had to say.)
I
have, however looked up the International Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
and have
submitted the three-page entry on ‘euthanasia’ in order to provide the
court
with an indication of the range of the arguments involved, and the
modern history
of the debate. As my son observed, without benefit of consulting an
encyclopaedia,
the question of whether to “kill or let die” is a matter for argument
amongst
learned individuals, and should not be regarded as in any way mandatory.
There
is NO consensus regarding this issue, and it is a hotly contested issue.
Legislation sensibly does not prescribe that dying animals must be
euthanased.
If
it is more natural to allow death to occur ‘with the family gathered
around the
bed’ rather than in hospital with tubes and machines everywhere, and a
plug
that can be pulled when the nod is given, then the equivalent of that
ideal
human scenario translated for Banjo meant that the script I was
following was
exactly right. He was lying down. I spent as much time as I could
sitting next
to him, talking quietly, and stroking him. He protected himself from
pain
through loss of consciousness – the semi-comatose or comatose state.
What
then of the theory that if an animal is in pain, or if it is dying, we
should
‘alleviate its distress’ using the only means available to us, namely to
kill
it, with active euthanasia techniques – potassium chloride injection or
whatever.
I
may not be an expert in law but I have spent a good part of my life
teaching
English in high schools and as a function of my time on University
faculties as
a sociology lecturer, regularly marking vast numbers of social sciences
essays
with a view to correcting and refining the students’ use of language in
order
to gain greater accuracy. So I can claim expert status with respect to
English
language issues, and I say categorically it is not possible to equate
‘alleviation of distress’ with the performance of euthanasia. There is still a slight chance that we may
avoid a totally Orwellian future, where euphemistic untruths stand in
for less
palatable realities. Let us talk about alleviation of distress in terms
of
comfort, of drugs, if you like – but not the act of killing. Killing is killing. Until we can call things
by their real names we will never be able to think clearly. If we think a
person or an animal would be better off dead, we should say so, not
pussy foot
around talking about “alleviation of distress”. And we are
categorically not
entitled to interpret any legislative insistence on alleviation of
distress as
equivalent to an insistence on ‘putting down’ or killing.
If I
could once again summarise to this point: Yes, I owned the dog. Yes, the
dog
was an animal within the meaning of the Act.
No,
I did not ill-treat this dog. He was dying. He was not ‘ill’ as such
(given that
clostridial infections are a ‘common exit pathway’ for animals in the
way
pneumonia is in humans). The claim that he was in unbearable pain, based
on the
diagnosis of clostridial infection, ignores the fact that nature has its
own
way of dealing with pain, and in this case Banjo was protected from pain
by
coma.
Nothing,
apart from recumbence, which we have dealt with separately, would
suggest to
any reasonable observer who knew his life and medical history that Banjo
was in
pain, as such, as distinct from being in the middle of the dying
process.
We
have been told that there must have been a wound by which the
clostridial
infection entered his body. But neither of our vetinarary specialists
saw such
a wound. I can therefore hardly be held accountable for not seeing such a
wound. We have also been given
veterinary testimony to the fact that no external sign of, for example,
oedema
or internal bleeding or any other aspect of his body’s finalbreakdown,
was
visible to the eye of even a very careful observer. All this information
and
supposition comes from the autopsy.
And
recumbence must be reckoned in this case, by foresight or hindsight, to
be part
of his dying, and not part of an illness from which he could have
recovered if
given attention.
We
must re-emphasise, furthermore, that the overall credibility of the
crown’s
star prosecution witnesses, our veterinary experts, must be strongly
discounted
when we realize that they could not supply an even nearly correct
estimate of
Banjo’s real age. It is as if a doctor looked at a woman of eighty-five,
and
estimated that she was probably between forty and fifty.
It
is absurd and not legislatively required that an animal dying of natural
causes
at the end of a long and happy life should be taken to a vet to be
killed, or
terminated.
Apart
from anything else it is an absurd notion that animal owning citizens
must pay
in the order of $200 to a vet for an interventionist termination if they
have a
pet that has come to the end of its natural life. Nor do I believe it
was
morally or legally incumbent upon me to have him euthanased (at a likely
cost
of $200) when he was recumbent, comatose, in no apparent pain, and
assessed by
me as likely to die within hours.
Approximately
83% of the population of Adelaide, unfortunately including myself,
cannot
afford to take an animal for veterinarian attention except for
life-saving
measures. No legislation exists to my knowledge that requires the owner
of
animal to have that animal’s life terminated by veterinarian
intervention because
that animal is, I repeat, comatose, apparently pain free, recumbent,
incontinent and dying.
There
is such a thing as a normal death, even if this is not amongst the
concepts
with which Dr. Lucas is familiar.
In
Banjo’s last days I did what any reasonable person would do, to make the
dog as
comfortable as possible, and to give him as much comfort as I could. He
had
water left close to him. He was kept in the shade. I talked to him. I
sat with
him. Given that he was incontinent, I shifted him regularly, and hosed
down
where he had been lying.
Because
he was a lovely dog, and had been my long-term companion I was certainly
upset
that he was dying, and had intended not only to bury him on the property
but to
give him a memorialized grave, with a headstone or some equivalent. I
had even
contemplated seeing if I could get a small statuette made. Admittedly,
these
things would have comforted me a little, rather more than Banjo. All
these
plans were ruthlessly destroyed by the RSPCA.
It does seem to me that we could usefully use an RSPCH – a Royal
Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Humans – to keep an eye on the
activities of
the RSPCA.
Now,
I would like to make a small aside at this point –namely to say that if I
were
to be thought culpable for failing to provide for veterinarian
intervention for
Banjo’s dying, and if we stay within the logic of this approach (which I
don’t
believe but would like to assume for the moment) Sharni Milburn, who is
by
profession a veterinarian nurse, is far more culpable than I am. She
came, she
saw - and she left! And with her
friends contacted the RSPCA, assertedly the next day. What kind of duty
of care
is that? Doctors have a duty of care to anyone ill or injured in their
presence. Surely the same applies to veterinary nurses.
We
may believe that they claim not to have contacted the RSPCA until Sunday
morning, because this provides an explanation of sorts (very
unsatisfactory at
that) for the fact that the RSPCA didn’t come to my home until late
Sunday
afternoon, when I was not there to protect Banjo from them.
On
the other hand Millburn’s behaviour,
and that of her friends may be further evidence in support of the
proposition
that this case is a beat-up, carefully orchestrated from beginning to
end to
destroy my life and reputation in Adelaide.
(The
timing of the RSPCA attendance at my property is suggestive of the high
likelihood that my home and activities were under surveillance, and that
the
RSPCA deliberately waited before making their move on that Sunday
afternoon to
hear that I had gone out. I had been home every day all day the entire
previous
week, including the immediately preceding Saturday when Nerlich and
Millburn
and their mysterious and so far unnamed and anonymous friend came by, a
good
25-6 hours before the RSPCA arrived.)
There
are other very suspicious aspects to this case, including the fact that
prosecution was not commenced until late July or early August in 2001,
when the
dog had been seized over eight months previously. I can speak to this if
the
court thinks it is relevant.
For
the moment I need to briefly revisit the five essential elements that
must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
I
want to say:
- the dog
did not suffer pain within the meaning of the Act, because it was
comatose,
with coma being nature’s way of
protecting living creatures from pain;
- that there
were no steps that I did not take, which could have been taken, which
would
have alleviated the pain suffered by the dog, since a) the dog was not
in any apparent
pain, and b) we are not entitled to interpret ‘alleviation of pain’ as
linguistically
equivalent to ‘killing’, ‘putting down’, ‘putting out of his misery’ or
any
other euphemism for terminating the life of the dog.
- that the
step which I am alleged not to have taken (which must be understood to
mean
that I did not take Banjo to a vet for active, interventionist
termination of
his life) was a course of action which may be common or ordinary, but
which
cannot be regarded as necessarily reasonable. There are other
rationalities
within which my behaviour can be categorized as both normal and optimal,
as
well as the best course of action available to me given my situation and
resources.
Finally,
it is relevant for the court to take into account my character, my
achievements, and my contribution to the public life of Adelaide,
especially my
contribution to the lives of some 2000 or more children who have
attended the
Early Reading Play School.
I
then presented to the court the following sets of documents:
A. My daughter, Shyamala’s, summary
outline of my
character (dated November 16, 1987):
“MyMum has
1. guts and strength of character
2. intelligence
3. unique ideas
4. wide interests
5. an inventive mind
6. creativity
7. artistic talent
8. love for her children
9. love for animals
10.
a
liking for weird and unusual things
11.
a
love of books and knowledge
12.
interesting
conversation
My Mum has given me
13.
genes
14.
love
15.
a
stimulating environment
16.
music
17.
reading
and a love of books
18.
artwork
19.
drive
20.
ambition
21.
a
role model
22.
belief
in myself
23.
kittens
and puppies to love and enjoy
24.
curiosity
and scepticism
25.
different
ways to look at things”
B. Matilda
Bawden’s affidavit.
“AFFIDAVIT
OF MATILDA BAWDEN
I, MATILDA
BAWDEN, of 10 Quondong Ave, Parafield
Gardens SA 5107, in the State of South
Australia, MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows:
1. I have
known the Respondent for over seven years,
through our membership in the Womens Electoral Lobby and South
Australian
Branch of Whistleblowers Australia Inc.
2. I am Treasurer of the South Australian WBA Branch as
well as National
Committee Member.
3. Ms Glynne Sutcliffe is well known by fellow-members
of the
South Australian Branch of Whistleblowers Australia Inc. (WBA).
As a human
being she has
been called upon to endure much. Her family life has been largely
destroyed; she has found herself socially isolated (not least
because of
her commitment to achieving something worthwhile with her Early Reading
Play
School); her financial situation is far worse than she had any
reason to
anticipate; she is only just managing to retain a level of viability
with
respect to both her physical and emotional stamina. Her current
stress
levels are compounded by what she and her supporters would regard as
grossly
unjust and unreasonable litigation instigated by the RSPCA
Many of
these have had
tragic consequences on her family life which
has been
largely destroyed. Consequently, she
has found herself: socially isolated, her Early Reading Play School
business
has been placed in jeopardy; with depleted financial resources;
and
declining general physical and mental health.
Her current stress levels are
compounded by
what she and her supporters would regard as grossly unjust and
unreasonable
litigation instigated by the RSPCA.
4. She
is generally respected as an honest
woman who has a high level of personal integrity. She values the
importance of continuous learning and education, and enjoys heated
debate on,
as much as general discussion of a wide range of social and political
topics.
She is admired as a woman with a deep commitment to the truth,
decency
and justice.
5. Glynne
Sutcliffe has had many members of WBA visit her home over the years.
Never
has any
member of WBA ever had a reason to be concerned about the care she has
given
her pets. If asked, they would say Ms Sutcliffe gave considerable
care
and attention to her pets. She is an animal-lover who sees her
pets as an
integral part of her household.
Banjo was part and parcel of her everyday life for sixteen years.
He was
in and out of the house all the time, until at the end his incontinence
meant
he had to be put outside. Because it
was summer, this was easier to do than if it had been winter.
6. On the day the report to the RSPCA was made, Ms Sutcliffe had
attended a meeting of WBA at Rostrevor.
7. Our
members have
discussed at length Ms Sutcliffe’s problems with the RSPCA and its legal
case
against her. From those discussions, I
can say that our President of WBA, Mr John Pezy and his wife, Shelley,
would
equally consider the charges against Ms Sutcliffe wrongful and incapable
of withstanding
the burden of proof required for a criminal conviction.
8. We consider the
case against her scandalous
aWeconsider the case against her scandalous and outrageous in the
extreme
forreasons outlined above as well as the fact that on our understanding
of the
matter, the RSPCA case is fundamentally flawed and logically unsound at
best.
9. It should
be noted from
the witness statement of Ms Sharni Millburn that at the time of her
visit to Ms
Sutcliffe’s house she did not identify herself as a Veterinary Nurse,
nor did
she say anything to her about the dog at all, let alone in the context
of her
qualifications, which are now being used and applied in the proceedings
against
her.
10. Based on
her own
statement, Ms Millburn commented to Leigh Nerlich, her companion, that
maybe a
suggestion should be made that the dog should be taken to a vet while
they were
outside discussing the kitten that was for sale. However,
nothing was said until after Leigh Nerlich told Ms
Sutcliffe that he did not want to buy the kitten when he merely
questioned her
about the general condition of the dog.
It was only after leaving the property that the two discussed the
notion
that maybe something should be done, such as phoning the RSPCA, and it
was not
until the following day that Nerlich rather than Millburn actually
phoned the
RSPCA. This sequence of events is not
consistent with a dog being in obvious need of relief from distress,
which was
not the case since it was comatose, but of the two having reached an
agreement
to deal with Ms Sutcliffe nonetheless, for personal reasons.
11. It
concerns our members
that the case presented against Ms Sutcliffe so far has largely focussed
on
erroneous, if not malicious, observations of her personality and
lifestyle
rather than the facts surrounding the care she had given an old and
dying dog…
12. Another
example of the flimsiness of the case against Ms Sutcliffe is evidenced
by the
statement by Veterinary Nurse, Ms Sharni Millburn, who observed that the
dog
had been “lying on concrete” rather than “soft material”.
As any Vet would attest, dogs with arthritic
conditions, including my own dog of 10 years, usually refuse to lie on
anything
other than cold (usually concrete) surfaces as the cold from concrete
floors
provides immediate relief from the arthritic pain and the heat that pain
generates.
13. I have,
myself, made available a kennel and various bedding for my dog,
including
trampoline-bed, kennel, carpets and sheep-skin rugs.
He will not sleep on any of these.
14. In the midst of all thenoise around the
allegations in this case, what is at risk of being lost is
that Ms Sutcliffe has not been accused of causing deliberate harm to the
dog in
question. The proposition that she ‘failed to alleviate
distress’
relies on amazing and hypothetical claims regarding the dog’s distress,
and
ignores the fact that the only action open to a vet consulted regarding
Banjo
at that stage of his near-ended life would be to have put him down.
15. Finally, it
is difficult to appreciate how this matter has managed to proceed in
light of
the fact that “expert” witnesses for the RSPCA have been unable to
accurately
determine the fact of the dog’s age and medical condition, despite an
autopsy. It, therefore, defies logic
and common sense to appreciate how a lay-person, such as Ms Sutcliffe,
might
reasonably have known a more appropriate/ curative treatment for the
dog’s
condition.
16. For this reason, if Ms Sutcliffe is found
guilty on the charges, a dangerous
and outrageous precedent would have been set that would hold almost
every pet
owner responsible for simply allowing an animal to die naturally.
SIGNED MATILDA BAWDEN, FEBRUARY 26, 2003.”
C. Dr Llewelyn’s
statement. (Not available in electronic format yet)
D. Robert Owen’s statement. (SEE
ABOVE)
E. My son’s assessment (SEE ABOVE)
F. Early Reading Play School info
sheet (SEE
BELOW)
Early Reading
Play School, Pty.
Ltd.
ABN 78
076952 184
Chandlers Hill,
SA
Mail : PO Box
486,Blackwood, SA 5051
Tel/ Fax +61
(0)8 8270 3548
email :
glynnesutcliffe@internode.on.net
web site :
www.users.on.net/glynnesutcliffe
What
you should know about the Early Reading Play School…..
Well,
it has developed a unique program that:
· responds to the recent brain research findings
that early learning actually increases a
child’s IQ, as well as supporting easy
and pleasurable learning in the years of formal schooling
· enables parents to take a successful initiating role
in their children’s formal learning, by
effectively sharing professional teaching skills with parents.
· Supports high academic achievement by a maximum
number of students in any given year level, and enables all
children to maximise
their personal best.
· provides a solution to ‘the literacy problem’ (and
makes reading a natural skill for all children who participate) by
ensuring
that all children who do the program start their school years 1) already
familiar
with their letters, 2) understanding the alphabetic principle,3)
with
phonemic awareness, and 4) able to code and decode from
speech to print, and from print back to speech. It is estimated that 98%
of
children can learn to read effectively using the phonics-based
approach
adopted by the school.
· shows how to tackle the double-edged myth that
children only learn well through self-initiated, discovery-based
learning,
and that they shouldn’t access any ‘direct content transmission’
· has the potential to allow all children to match the intellectual
performance
levels of children from those cultural environments where
children customarily excel throughout and beyond the school years.
· could well prove to be an effective way to give disadvantaged
children a good education
· requires a relatively small
amount of time from both professionals and parents. (Parent-child
classes
are held one hour every fortnight, and are backed up by 15-20 mins a day
at
home.)
If you’d like to
find out more, there is a 20pp.profile of the school available on
request.
Film footage on the school is available from several
TV current affairs reports.
This page uploaded 14thApril 2003.
Media Release below:
LEGAL SYSTEM
REMAINS WIDE OPEN TO ABUSE
Media release
Date:
April 14th, 2003
Contact: 8270
3548
Our courts
continue to be
vulnerable to exploitation by powerful groups and individuals who use
the legal
system for their own nefarious purposes, clog up court time, and waste
social
resources that should be dedicated to the provision of justice. A recent
case
has once again demonstrated this abuse.
If it didn’t have some quite tragic elements it could even be
regarded
as a Comedy Hour special.
Animal welfare
cases have a
unique power to prompt community outrage. The downside of this is that
an
accusation of cruelty is in itself almost sufficient to carry the day,
and
critical scrutiny of the charge is extremely difficult. In addition, the
RSPCA
has assiduously built up a public profile of noble endeavor, which makes
the
assertions of its ‘inspectors’ generally taken at face value as true.
But in the UK,
and to a
lesser extent in Australia, there is a growing awareness that the RSPCA
has a
high vested interest in prosecutions, and that some common features of
these prosecutions
should provoke deep unease.
Firstly, it is
through
maintaining a high level of prosecutions that the RSPCA generates the
high
profile that assures the public that they are doing a good job in
protecting
animals (and thereby persuades a goodly number of individuals –
primarily older
women - that they are deserving of donations and bequests).
Secondly,
prosecutions are
almost all of individuals, most often of older women (!), who are
vulnerable
because they live alone, and are unable to access the resources
necessary to
mounting an adequate legal defence. Alternately they do not fully
understand
the need to defend themselves, or the possible consequences if they do
not.
Large corporations or those with a degree of social power do not find
themselves hauled into court by the RSPCA (witness the live sheep trade,
RSPCA
approval given to halal slaughter techniques, the ‘barnyard egg’
scam,
etc.) The RSPCA is increasingly noted as itself engaging in cruelties
and
unkindnesses that are provoking, e.g. a group called CAPACS (the
Campaign to
Protect Animals in Charity Shelters)
In Australia,
asserted
cruelty to dogs provides the RSPCA with a major fraction of the
prosecutions by
which they seek to achieve the twin goals of high profile prosecutions
of
vulnerable individuals.
The most
recent case of
concern to those interested in social justice is that of Glynne
Sutcliffe, who
has been prosecuted by the RSPCA for “Ill-treatment of an animal” (viz, a
red
kelpie dog named Banjo, who was seized by, and euthanased at the behest
of, the
RSPCA, on Sunday 17thDecember 2000).
On the basis
of veterinary
advice, the RSPCA maintained that the dog was suffering from necrotising
cellulitis and clostridial infection.
The two vets
consulted by the
RSPCA (Dr. Sarah Drysdale at the Anzac highway after hours clinic, and
Dr.
Julie Lucas at the veterinarian pathology lab on Frome Rd.) estimated
Banjo’s
age respectively as : a) between five
and nine years of age, and b) between eight and ten years of age.
Put down on 17th
December
2000, Banjo was born in late October 1984. He had reached the ripe old
age of
sixteen years and two months of age!
Perhaps one vet could make a mistake like this. Two seems less
likely.
So we ask - would any purpose be served by underestimating his age? Well, yes!!
The accepted
life expectancy
for an Australian red kelpie is ‘between 10 and 14 years of age”. So the
vets’
(collusive?) underestimation of his age placed Banjo as younger than the
lower
limit of life expectancy. As such it would mean that he was ill, and
possibly
neglected – and not, as he actually was, dying of old age.
It is worth
saying that vets are usually able to estimate any animal’s
age pretty accurately, and the error in estimating Banjo’s age was so
great
that it calls into doubt the entire veterinary evidence presented in
court. So
one questions the accuracy of the diagnosis of illness. Initially one
could
have easily assumed that maybe because Banjo was old, he was vulnerable
to
infection, and that his death was triggered by infection even when it
was
fundamentally due to his age.
However the
diagnosis of necrotising cellulits and clostridial infection
is so convenient to explaining why a dog said to be so young was
recumbent and
dying, that it does become possible to doubt the clinical diagnosis
also. The
long list of symptoms said by Dr. Lucas as necessarily displayed by
Banjo was
not only suppositional but also completely fanciful, only excepting his
being recumbent
and comatose. Is it possible that the veterinary diagnosis was offered
as the
only plausible explanation for the poor state of a dog said (or, maybe,
supposed) to be under ten years of age. Supposition is not usually
deemed to be
an ideal source of acceptable proof.
Now at this
point we can gain
insight from observations made of RSPCA prosecutions in the UK, where
deliberate false testimony has been made under oath on more than one
occasion,
and where the RSPCA has taken care to develop protocols that prevent the
accused from contradicting so called ‘expert’ witnesses in court.
This is done:
a) by seizing
the animal and holding it incommunicado for long enough to make the
examination
by any vet on behalf of the accused no
longer relevant to assessing the animal’s condition at time of seizure,
or
b)cremating the animal (i.e. cremating the evidence) prior to laying
charges
and prior to the accused realizing the need to have their own ‘expert’
to
address the situation.
Banjo was
cremated, so far as
one could tell, on Monday 18th December 2000. Charges were
laid in
late July or early August 2001. Should Ms Sutcliffe have obtained and
wished to
follow legal advice to obtain her own veterinarian diagnosis, it would
have
been completely impossible to do so. All the evidence was destroyed in
the
cremation.
A trial was
scheduled for
September 2001, which Ms.Sutcliffe overlooked because she was preparing
to go
overseas to visit her son in Louisiana. When she didn’t appear, the
trial was
re-scheduled for October and she was convicted and fined $1500 in her
absence.
When she came back to Adelaide and realized what had happened, she
applied to
the court for a new trial which the then Chief Magistrate Alan Munn was
reluctant to grant until her absence overseas and ignorance of events in
Adelaide were pointed out. When the CM felt obligated to concede her
right to a
trial at which she was present, he actually said that she’d be sorry
she’d
asked, because she would certainly end up worse off.
The trial was
then scheduled
for July 2nd and 3rd 2002. Proceedings on the first day -which
consisted almost entirely of Peter Masters’ highly coloured negative
testimony
- were reported on p.7 of The Advertiser on July 4th.
When
the newspaper was asked to publish corrective details that emerged from
Ms.Sutcliffe’s cross-examination of the witnesses on the second day the
editor refused.
The trial, still unfinished, was then set to continue in November2002,
but Ms.
Sutcliffe sought and obtained an adjournment partly for health reasons
(she was
recovering from surgery in September) and partly for professional
reasons – as
Director of the Early Reading Play School she needed to give her
attention to
the multitude of tasks entailed in bringing the year to a close.
The trial
resumed on Tuesday
25th February. It continued on Thursday 27thFebruary.
And
then again on Tuesday 11th March.
And judgment is to be handed down on 14thApril, 2003. The ridiculous prolongation of proceedings
(e.g. attempting to determine with finality whether or not a dog is an
animal
within the meaning of the Act) should be noted to be another form of
abuse that
has become a perfected art form with the purpose of increasing court
costs,
which if they can be awarded against the accused, increase the impact of
the
fine by several multiples.
When
proceedings did not
conclude on Tuesday 25thFebruary Ms. Sutcliffe became
distressed and
hysterical. Subsequently she experienced periods of a fluttering
sensation in
her chest cavity sufficiently severe to send her to her doctor, who
immediately
ordered an ECG. The ECG shows “paroxysmal a trial fibrillation”. This is
a life
threatening condition which can be ameliorated with a pacemaker, but
which
constitutes an ongoing threat that she will have a heart attack, or a
stroke
generated by blood pooling in the heart into a clot that will rise to
the
brain. While the severity of the episodes have diminished, the condition
has
not and will not go away. Low fibrillation is as threatening as fast
fibrillation. Sensations worsen when she lies down, making sleep
hazardous. Her
life has thus been directly threatened and almost certainly shortened by
the
RSPCA’s abusive use of the legal system, and the court’s willingness to
collude
with the RSPCA to prolong proceedings to an unbearable degree. The
motive is
almost certainly to “teach her a lesson”. Perhaps it is the RSPCA that
needs to
be taught a lesson, and the courts that need to be called back to attend
to
their proper duties, which do not include putting a woman on trial
because her
16 year old dog, for whom she was already grieving, was pre-emptively
euthanased by the RSPCA when he was in the midst of his dying.
